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 It has been over 72 years since Indonesia proclaimed her independence 
on 17 August 1945. However, the 350 years of the Dutch colonization 
is still impacting the lives of the Indonesian people. The difficulties faced 
by the Indonesian legal system as the government tries to accommodate 
adat (custom) and religion principles within the national law and the 
extent to which this legal mechanism affects the everyday life of the 
Indonesian people. In a nation where customs and religion are so 
preeminent, setting up an all-inclusive document meant to be the 
foundation of the state’s legal system at the dawn of independence was 
no easy task. This paper discusses the practice of legal pluralism in 
Indonesia and its struggle to implement rule of law and human rights 
principles after a half-century of authoritarian regimes. The study 
involves socio-legal research drawing on empirical data. Survey 
research was conducted between September 2014 and February 2015 at 
Utrecht University, the Netherlands, as well as in 5 cities in Indonesia 
(Aceh, Bali, Batam, Medan, and Padang) to collect data. The research 
reveals that legal pluralism is not helping to strengthen the Indonesian 
legal system, and that the foreignness of the Western law along with the 
neglect of the Indonesian customary and Islamic laws, totalitarianism 
and military involvement in politics, corruption within the state 
apparatus and unsynchronized laws weaken the legal system in 
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1.  Introduction  
The Indonesian legal system did not change very much after independence was 
proclaimed in August 1945 since the newly born republic operated on the same legal 
and political logic as its colonial predecessors, handing out titles as it deemed fit.1 
                                                          
1  See Franz von Benda-Beckmann. (2001). “Legal Pluralism and Social Justice in Economic and Political 
Development,” IDS Bulletin, 32 (1). 
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Before the arrival of Dutch traders and colonizers in the late 16th century and early 17th 
century, indigenous kingdoms prevailed and applied a system of adat on the 
archipelago.2  
In contemporary Indonesia, three strands of law prevail: Dutch civil law,3 chthonic (or 
indigenous) law,4 and religious laws as the government struggles to accommodate the 
rights of community members. However, the recognition of these rights is rather 
ambiguous and subject to the state’s regulatory control”.5 Ever since their 
independence, many postcolonial nations are caught in between weak and sometimes 
contradicting legal systems as they try to introduce a rather strange Western legal 
tradition into a social field dominated by either tradition or religion or sometimes both 
at the same time as the case of Indonesia. This seems not to be working out, and 
therefore a new approach has to be considered. As argued at the outset of this paper, 
building a legal system in a country made up of more than seventeen islands and home 
to one thousand ethnic groups6 such as Indonesia at the dawn of independence was a 
delicate task. And although the Indonesian ‘founding fathers’ have succeeded in 
preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the vast nation under one flag, one 
anthem, and one language, the legal system remains undermined by a number of 
problems.  
The first part of this paper presents an overview historical development of the 
Indonesian legal system while part two discusses the practice of legal pluralism in 
Indonesia by presenting role of adat law and Islamic law within the Indonesian legal 
system. Part three on the other hand investigates some of main difficulties faced by 
Indonesia in her effort to build an all-inclusive efficient legal system that champions 
the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
 
2.  Reviewing the Indonesian Legal System 
2.1.  The pre-independence legal system 
The Indonesian legal system came into existence after the proclamation of 
independence on August 17, 1945. Needless to say, that this was critical to Indonesia as 
legal institution along with judiciary matters would be handed over to the Indonesian 
people. The Indonesian Constitution, the 1945 Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar 1945 
or UUD’ 1945) is the basic law upon which every law and regulation is based. All laws 
enacted by the Dutch administration during colonization were to be repealed because 
they “contravened the constitution”.7 In fact, before establishing the Indonesian 1945 
                                                          
2  See Marzuki, P.M. (2011), An Introduction to Indonesian Law, Chap. I. Malang: Setara, p.2 
3  See Lukito, R. (2013), Legal pluralism in Indonesia: bridging the unbridgeable. Routledge. p. 5-6 
4  Patrick Glenn’s book Legal Traditions of the World offers a major new means of conceptualizing law 
and legal relations across the world. In Chapter 3 he argues that National laws are placed in the 
broader context of major legal traditions, those of chthonic (or indigenous) law, talmudic law, civil law, 
Islamic law, common law, Hindu law, and Confucian law. He claims that Chthonic law is inextricably 
interwoven with all the beliefs of chthonic and indigenous peoples and is inevitably, and profoundly, 
infused with all those other beliefs. See: Glenn, H.P. (2004). Legal Traditions of the World, Second Edition. 
New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 432 
5  See Benda-Beckmann, F. von and K. von Benda-Beckmann (2001), Recreating the nagari: 
Decentralisation in West Sumatra. Working Paper No. 31. Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology. 
6  This figure is based on the 2010 census provided by the Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of 
Statistics). 
7  Marzuki, P.M. Op.Cit., p.2 
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constitution, “only Dutch rules and regulations were applied throughout the 
archipelago to the detriment of the indigenous” as Marzuki asserts. He also argues that 
no modern law existed until the adoption of the Reglement op de Rechterlijke Organisatie 
en Het Beleid der Justitie (Regulation of Judiciary and the Policy of Justice), abbreviated 
as R.O. Algemene Bepalingen van Wetgeving (General Provision of Legislation), 
commonly abbreviated as A.B., Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code), referred to as B.W., 
Wetboek van Koophandel (Commercial Code), commonly called W.v.K., and Bepalingen 
Betrekkelijk Onvermogen, Misdrijven, Begaan ter Gelegenheid van Faillisement en bij 
Kennelijk, Mitsgaders bij Surseance van Betaling (Provision on Crimes related to 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency). These laws have been enacted by Royal Decree of May 16, 
1847 and officially promulgated in the Netherlands-India Gazette of 1847 No. 23. It was 
not until 2004 that most of these laws were amended.8  
The law preceding the colonial-made constitution called Regeringsreglement, commonly 
abbreviated as R.R. was patterned on the 1848 Netherlands Constitution as Marzuki 
observes. The R.R. was used as basic law made by Dutch Crown and the Netherlands 
Parliament in charge of controlling the colony. Such law was based on the article 59 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the then amended Dutch Constitution. The R.R. was enacted on 
January 1, 1848 and became effective in 1885. In the Netherlands, this was just a basic 
regulation to carry out government power, but in occupied Indonesia, it was deemed 
as a constitution, argues Marzuki. In January 1, 1942, the R.R., was replaced by the 
Indische Straatsregeling commonly abbreviated as I.S,9  which was also deemed as a 
constitution to indigenous but considered by the colonizer as a mere law just like the 
R.R. It was the I.S., the so called constitution that really brought distinction between 
ruler and indigenous Marzuki argues. In a view similar to Marzuki’s view, Robert R. 
Strang,10 observes:  
Like many other former colonies of Continental Europe, Indonesia generally follows the civil 
law tradition. During the colonial period, the Dutch maintained a dual criminal justice 
system within Indonesia-one court system for the Dutch and other foreigners living in the 
colony and a second court system for indigenous Indonesians, the pribumi. 
Although the Dutch to some extent allowed the Indonesian people to use adat law for 
their local affairs such as matters related to land and family, they did not really 
encourage a strong legal pluralism as adat law was not even considered as a law in 
their eyes. Legal pluralism could not flourish during colonialism for it would have 
challenged the hegemony of the colonists by granting equal status to both adat and 
colonial laws. A strong legal pluralism under the colonial administration would have 
enhanced the rights of the Indonesian people, thus leading to freedom and prosperity, 
which are concepts the Dutch did not want to hear. As argued above, on 17 August 
1945 independence was proclaimed and a new state was born. The new rulers 
promised transformation as they embarked on social and legal reforms. But has 
anything really changed ever since? 
                                                          
8  See Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro. (2005), Guide to doing Business in Indonesia. Available online 
at: http://www.abnrlaw.com/download/document/Doing_Business_in_Indonesia_-_ABNR_-_2017. 
pdf  
9  Read Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, Negara Hukum dan Permasalahan Akses Keadilan di Negeri-Negeri 
Beerkembang Pasca- Kolonial, Konferensi dan Dialog National Jakarta, 9‐10 Oktober 2012 
10  See R. Strang (2008), More Adversarial, but not Completely Adversarial: Reformasi of the Indonesian Criminal 
Procedure Code. Fordham International Law Journal Vol. 32 Issue 1. 
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2.2.  The post-independence legal system 
The Indonesian legal system is partially based on Roman-Dutch law, customary law 
and Islamic law. Given to the fact that most of the Indonesian archipelago was under 
Dutch rule for about three and half centuries (1602 – 1945). Prior to the first appearance 
of Dutch traders and colonists in the late 16th century and early 17th century, 
indigenous kingdoms prevailed and applied a system of adat (customary) law. The 
Dutch presence and subsequent colonization during the next 350 years until the end of 
World War II left a legacy of Dutch colonial law. A number of such colonial legislations 
continue to apply today. Subsequently, after Indonesia declared independence on 17 
August 1945, the Indonesian authorities began creating a national legal system based 
on Indonesian precepts of law and justice.  
These three strands of law: adat law, Dutch colonial law and Islamic law co-exist in 
modern Indonesia. For example, commercial law is grounded upon the Commercial 
Code 1847 (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Dagang or Wetboek van Koophandel), a relic of 
the colonial period. However, commercial law is also supplemented by a large number 
of new laws enacted since independence. They include the Banking Law 1992 
(amended in 1998), Company Law 1995, Capital Market Law 1995, Antimonopoly Law 
1999, and the Oil & Natural Gas Law 2001. Adat law is less conspicuous.11 However, 
some adat principles such as “consensus through decision making” (musyawarah untuk 
mufakat) appear in modern Indonesian legislation. Islamic laws came up and have 
greatly influenced Indonesian National Marriage Law (Act No. 1/1974), Islamic Court 
Law (Act No. 7/1989), Zakat/ Alms law, Wakaf law, Islamic banking law, and so 
forth.12 Islamic law in Indonesia applies only in civil matters, however in Aceh 
province, the northernmost province of Indonesia, Islamic law also applies for certain 
offenses such as adultery, gambling, khalwat (intimacy without marriage bound), and 
selling and drinking alcohol. The legal bases of such laws are local regulations (Qanun).   
A part from the statutes, political concepts played significant role in post-inde 
pendence Indonesia. From 1945 to 1965 Indonesia was ruled by Sukarno, Indonesia 
first president whose entire regime revolved around a concept known as Orde Lama 
(Old Order) whereby all government powers were in the hands of the ruler. Shortly 
after seizing power, President Sukarno took a presidential decree to create Pancasila, a 
constitution-like concept that quickly became the driving force of the law in Indonesia. 
In 1965, a new political concept known as Orde Baru was brought in by Suharto, 
Indonesia’s second president who vowed to boost the economy but did very little to 
put a stop to authoritarianism and dictatorship. Both the political and legal fields were 
regulated by Suharto’s idea of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided-Democracy) that did not 
allow political and legal freedoms as shall be showed later on.  
Despite a few reforms however, the post-independence legal system did not really 
break from its predecessor as many laws are still patterned on colonial laws. It was not 
until the advent of the Era Reformasi in 1998 that major positive changes were made to 
the Indonesian legal system. 
                                                          
11  Marzuki, P.M. (2011), Op.Cit., p.2 
12  See Omara, A. (2011). “Does the Current Regional Autonomy Support Legal Pluralism in Indonesia?”, 
Jurnal Mimbar Hukum, Vol 23, No 2. 
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2.3.  The era reformasi legal system 
The political concept known as Era Reformasi (Reformation Era) ensuing the fall of the 
Suharto’s regime in May 1998 is regarded as the Indonesian government’s attempt to 
bring about political, legal and social changes in response to the people’s demand for 
greater individual freedom, democracy and human rights. But more importantly, it 
was a call for more regional autonomy and a greater recognition of adat rights to 
village resources. It is the political era considered by many if not all Indonesians 
including foreign observers as the era that brought about significant changes to 
Indonesia. This passage discusses some of these changes. From colonial time to 
Sukarno’s Orde Lama followed by Suharto’s Orde Baru, the Indonesian people have 
been in search for democracy, political and economic freedom. However, change did 
not really occur until 21 May 1998 when President Suharto yielding to public pressure 
and growing civil disorder in the wake of a continuing economic crisis, resigned and 
ceded power to his Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie who, though very close 
to Suharto,13 vowed to turn Indonesia away from the path it had taken under his 
predecessors. Habibie’s began reforming by immediately releasing political prisoners14 
such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Muchtar Pakpahan, and Xanana Gusmão. Provinces 
were given greater control over their finances through regional Autonomy (Otonomi 
Dearah).15 President Habibie revoked some of the economic privileges given to the 
former president Suharto’s family, though both were close. Although Habibie did not 
last in office for his bit to prolong his term failed to meet MPR’s approval, he did 
accomplish a few crucial reforms worth mentioning: 
a) Enacting human rights provisions; 
b) Allowing the establishment of new political parties and unions; 
c) Releasing political prisoners; and 
d) Limiting the presidency to two terms of five years. 
The advent of Era Reformasi has allowed Indonesia to hold its first direct presidential 
election in July 2004 that was won by a retired army general and former security 
minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who vowed to fix the economy and to eradicate 
corruption. In fact, it was under president Yudhoyono’s administration that the 
Corruption Eradication Commission or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK)16 
established in 2002 began to operate. After two terms, President Susilo Bambang left 
office and was replaced by Joko Widodo who won the 2014 election.  
In less than two decades, Indonesia has known five presidents: Habibie period (1998-
October 1999), Abdurahman Wahid (1999-July 2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-
October 2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono period (2004 – 2014) and Joko Widodo 
                                                          
13  It is assumed that Suharto is the father figure to Habibie. Two situations could justify this assumption: 
first the fact that Habibie was a key player in Suharto's administration, and second, Habibie's refusal to 
order a thorough investigation into Suharto's accumulated wealth after he was removed from office in 
May 1998. 
14  Read Jajat Burhanudin, Kees van Dijk. (2013), Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations. 
Amsterdam University Press. p. 9 
15  See Law No. 22/1999 on Regional autonomy. 
16  The Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) is the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission, 
which was formed after special consideration on the extraordinary nature of corruption in Indonesia, 
which has become systemic and widespread, and has violated the human rights of the Indonesian 
people. The KPK was formed under Act No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission. 
P-ISSN: 2442-9880, E-ISSN: 2442-9899 
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(October 2014-present). This could be interpreted as the Indonesian people’s aspiration 
to democracy and freedom. 
Last but not the least, Era Reformasi paved the way for implementing the rule of law 
and democracy through a series of amendments to the Indonesian 1945 Constitution. 
This was done in four stages at sessions of the People's Consultative Assembly in 1999, 
2000, 2001, and 2002. As a result, the original Constitution has grown from 37 articles to 
73, of which only 11% remain unchanged from the original constitution.17 The 
following are some of the major amendments made to the Indonesian 1945 
Constitution:18  
a) Limiting presidents to two terms of office; 
b) Establishing a Regional Representative Council (DPD), which together with the 
People's Representative Council (DPR) makes up an entirely elected People's 
Consultative Assembly; 
c) Purifying and empowering a presidential system of government, instead of a semi 
presidential one; 
d) Stipulating democratic, direct elections for the president, instead of the president 
being elected by the People's Consultative Assembly; 
e) Reorganizing the mechanism of horizontal relation among state organs, instead of 
giving the highest constitutional position to the People's Assembly; 
f) Abolishing the Supreme Advisory Council; 
g) Mandating direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair elections for the House of 
Representatives and regional legislatures; 
h) Establishing a Constitutional Court for guarding and defending the constitutional 
system as set forth in the constitution; 
i) Establishing a Judicial Commission. 
These reforms, if implemented sincerely, could boost the Indonesian legal system. Era 
reformasi has helped revitalize the dormant adat law along with customary institutions 
through the decentralization Law as discussed above. However, the extent to which 
adat has been revitalized and its position within the Indonesian legal system is worth 
discussing. 
 
2.4.  The role of adat law 
When Indonesia achieved independence in 1945, it inherited a justice system 
combining adat law, Islamic law, and Dutch civil law.19 The Dutch administration had 
dealt with the plurality of customary norms and institutions by establishing a rather 
weak hybrid legal system that applied different laws to different racial groups. In 
simple terms, Europeans were subject to Dutch law while Indonesians to traditional 
customary or adat law. But the notion ‘adat law’ was not recognized by the Dutch 
administration still it was brought up by Snouck Hurgronje in his work ‘De Atjehers’.20  
However, the position of adat law changed in 1999 when Indonesia instituted a broad 
process of regional autonomy. Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance authorized 
district governments to reconfigure village governance structures —including dispute 
                                                          
17  See Indrayana, D. (2008), Indonesian Constitutional Reform, 1999-2002: An Evaluation of Constitution. 
Jakarta: KOMPAS Book Publishing, p.331 
18  See Asshiddiqie, J. (2009), The Constitutional Law of Indonesia, Maxwell Asia, Singapore. 
19  Lukito, R. (2013), Op.Cit. p. 6 
20  Marzuki, P.M. (2011), Op.Cit. p.4 
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resolution mechanisms —along inclusive and democratic lines.21  In accordance with 
regional autonomy, the law established democratically elected village parliaments and 
devolved a greater degree of executive authority. On the “judicial” side, article 101(e) 
gave binding authority to village heads to resolve disputes.  
Customary justice systems in Indonesia have contributed immensely in the 
dispensation of justice services to poor and vulnerable people. Adat law is a law is well 
understood since it originates with the people in the most direct sense. Customary law 
tribunals are popular as they are accessible and familiar to the local populace. 
Generally, every actor involved in the customary legal system such as neighborhood 
heads, village heads, and religious leaders are based in the village, known to 
community members and are accessible. By contrast, state legal institutions are often 
located in distant district capitals. Even though customary law prevails in almost every 
aspect of people’s life, it is still under the domination of state law. 
 
2.5.  The role of the Islamic law 
The existence of first Islamic courts in Indonesia remains poorly documented,22 thus 
leaving the subject matter to divers interpretations. However some Islamic scholars 
argue that Islam was brought into Indonesia by Islamic traders from India during the 
13th century.23 By the end of the 16th century, Islam was ahead of Hinduism and 
Buddhism as the leading religion of the peoples of Java and Sumatra with the 
exception of Bali that retained a Hindu-practicing majority, while the eastern islands 
remained largely animist until the 17th and 18th centuries when Christianity became 
predominant in those areas.24 From what precedes, it is clear that the existence of 
Islamic court in Indonesia was prior to the arrival of the Dutch. The resolutie der indische 
Regeling enacted by the Dutch on 25 May 1760 was only a set of rules of on marriage 
and inheritance according to Islamic law.25 Based on this ordinance, the Dutch created 
collegial courts in which a district-level religious official called the penghulu acted as 
chair and was assisted by member judges chosen from the local religious elite. The 
courts were vested with power to decide family disputes, but execution of the courts’ 
decisions required an executory decree from the civil court. The system was expanded 
to south Kalimantan in the 1930s, but at the same time the jurisdiction over inheritance 
was transferred to the civil courts. The Dutch did not seek to regulate the 
administration of Islamic law beyond the territory of Java, Madura, and parts of 
Borneo. In other parts of the colony, the matter remained under the control of local 
authorities as observed by Cammack and R. Michael Feener.26  
At independence, the Islamic judiciary was placed under the authority of the Ministry 
of Religion, which used executive powers to expand the system to other parts of the 
country. On 29 December 1989, Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Court (Pengadilan 
                                                          
21  See Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which repealed Law No. 22/1999 on Regional 
Government. 
22  See Daniel S. Lev. (1972), Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal 
Institutions. The Preface. University of California Press. 
23  Ibid. p. 4-5 
24  Burhanudin, J., & van Dijk, K. (2013). Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations. 
Amsterdam University Press. p. 109 
25  See Asep Saepudin, Resume Sejarah Peradilan Agama di Indonesia. Fakultas Syari’ah Institut Agama Islam 
Negeri Raden Intan Bandar Lampur 2009-2010 
26  Burhanudin, J., & van Dijk, K. Op.Cit., p. 109 
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Agama) was passed by the People’s House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat (DPR). This law is indicative of the important role that the Religious Court plays 
in Indonesian law and the community generally. Islamic law contributed in the 
development of legal language. The word ‘hukum’ which is the Indonesian for ‘law’ 
originated from Arabic.27 Many other words such as hak (right), adil (just) from which 
stem the terms keadilan (justice) and pengadilan (court), hakim (judge), adat (custom) 
derive also from Arabic. Islamic law also impacted on the Indonesian legal philosophy. 
Concepts such as musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (concensus) are Arabic words 
and are always heard in dispute resolution.  
In 2004, the administrative supervision of the Islamic judiciary was transferred from 
the Ministry of Religion to the Supreme Court. However, earlier in 1999, the province 
of Aceh was granted special autonomy status that included the authority to enforce 
Islamic law in areas beyond the established jurisdictions of Sharia courts in the rest of 
the country. Other areas, including Aceh, Jambi, Sambas, Pontianak, the East coast of 
Borneo, South Sulawesi, Ternate, and Ambon had separate Islamic tribunals staffed by 
judges called “qadi” (sometimes written “kadi” or “kali”) or “hakim”.28  Finally, in West 
Sumatra, religious issues were decided by an assemblage of customary or adat leaders 
and religious officials that was called the “Friday Council”.29   
It is important to note that even though Islamic law seems to have strong power in 
many areas, the Religious Judicature Act declares the Supreme Court to be the highest 
judicial authority on matters of Islamic law.30  The Indonesian Islamic Courts have 
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.  The Marriage Act deals with the substantive 
law of marriage and divorce.31 However, when new courts were created in other parts 
of the country after independence, the jurisdiction of these new tribunals was defined 
more broadly to include both matrimonial causes and inheritance. Many discrepancies 
in the jurisdiction of Islamic Courts in different areas remained until the passage of the 
Religion Law in 1989, which, for the first time, established a uniform jurisdiction for all 
Islamic tribunals nationwide. The Act provides for the existence of first instance courts, 
called Peradilan Agama in every district (kabupaten) and municipality (kotamadya), and 
for an Islamic appeals court, called Peradilan Tinggi Agama in every province.32   
Unlike adat law, enough room has been given to Islamic law within the Indonesian 
legal system. Islamic law has contributed not only into bringing notions like morality, 
ethics, and decency within the political arena, but it also helped maintaining public 
order. Leaders have used the powers granted them through the decentralization laws 
to implement regulations relating to the wearing of Islamic dresses, proscribe conduct 
such as prostitution, gambling, and sale or consumption of alcohol, the insertion of 
Arabic programs at school, the prohibition of sexual intercourse before marriage 
                                                          
27  See Lev, D.S. (1972), Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions. 
University of California Press. p. 5 
28  Examples of decisions made by Islamic tribunals from south Sulawesi and Ternate can be found in 29 
Adat Rechtbundels: Bezorgd Door de Commissie Voor Het Adat Recht 37-201 (1928). 
29  See Supomo (1987), Bab-bab Tentang Hukum Adat, Pradnya Paramita, Jakarta. 
30  See Religious Judicature Act, Act No. 7/ 1989, and article. 3-5(1). 
31  See Salim, A. (2007), Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shift in Plural Legal Orders of Contemporary 
Aceh. A Paper presented at the First International Conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, 
Banda Aceh 24–26 February 2007 
32  See Cammack, M.E., & Feener, R.M. (2012), The Islamic Legal System in Indonesia, Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal Vol. 21 No. 1. 
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(khalwat) and the administration of the Islamic Tax (Zakat).33  However, despite the fact 
that the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim, the post-independence 
governments did not opt for the implementation of Islamic Law in Indonesia, the 
world largest Islamic State. Studies suggest that this was mainly due to political 
reasons as well as the divergence among the world Islamic Schools as noticed by 
Francois Borella (2008). In fact, Borella argues that between 750 and 850 AD, four 
Islamic Schools of Law gradually gained power as the orthodox interpretation of the 
Sharia giving birth to fiqh or legal science. Named after their author, these four schools 
of law spread today throughout every major Islamic State or dar al Islam (House or 
Country of Islam): North Africa and Sub-Saharan is maliki (founded by Malik ibn 
Anas),34 Egypt, the Middle East, and Central Asia are hanafi (founded by Abu Hanifa 
an-Nu’man),35 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are hanbali (founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal), 
Eastern Africa and Asia are chafi’I (founded by Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi’i).36   
These schools have different views on technical matters.37 Islam clearly could not be 
the foundation of the Indonesian legal system in that the Indonesian population, 
contrary to many Islamic States is not homogenous. The Indonesian “founding fathers” 
understood this when Sukarno declared that Indonesia should be on nothing but the 
doctrine of Pancasila (Sanskrit for “five principles”), defined in the constitution as [“] 
where does this quote end a belief in the one supreme god; just and civilized humanity; 
the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations among 
representatives; social justice for all the Indonesian people. Proclaiming Indonesia as 
an Islamic state at the dawn of independence was too controversial to be realistic, the 
minority Christians would have objected and those in Eastern Indonesia might have 
been tempted to secede as Robert Cribb puts it.38  Cammack and R. Michael Feener 
made the same remark when they argue that the Indonesian founding fathers were 
divided on the issue of Islamic law and Islamic courts, and the status and survival of a 
separate system of Islamic tribunals was for many years uncertain.39  
 
3.  The Problems within the Indonesian Legal 
3.1.  Foreignness of the colonial law and the neglect of adat law 
A law that governs the life of a free people should be of they own making, and so 
should be their legal system and legal institutions. Unfortunately, this was not the case 
in many postcolonial countries, including Indonesia. Wignjosoebroto,40 an Indonesian 
scholar argues that the concept of Rechtsstaat is foreign to Indonesian civilization. He 
observes that the legal system in the developing world is alien to the people for it does 
                                                          
33  Salim, A. (2007), Op.Cit. 
34  See Ramadan, H.M. (2006), Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary, Rowman 
Altamira, p. 26-27 
35  Ibid. p. 24-29 
36  Saeed, A. (2008). Op.Cit., p. 17 
37  Borella, F. (2008). Elements de droit constitutionel. Paris Presses de Sciences Po, p. 344 
38  Read Emmerson, D.K. (1999). Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity, Economy, Society, and Transition. M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc. Armonk, New York. Chap. I, p. 21 
39  Cammack, M.E., & Feener, R.M. (2012), Op.Cit. 
40  See Wignjosoebroto, S. Masalah Pluralisme Dalam Pemikiran Dan Kebijakan Perkembangan Hukum 
Nasional. Seminar Nasional Pluralisme Hukum: Perkembangan di Beberapa Negara, Sejarah 
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not really reflect their cultures and way of life. He refers to this situation as “the law of 
non-transferable law” and he claims that the shaping of the legal systems in the West 
was a populist revolution in Western civilization whereas in postcolonial countries it 
was imposed upon indigenous people. He believes that written law does not always 
reflect the law of the people who live and abide by local law in their daily lives. He 
goes on to say that the Western law is not understood by the people it is meant for due 
to not only unconsciousness but also unwillingness.  Much like many other Indonesian 
legal scholars, Wignjosoebroto concludes that the legal system inherited from the 
Dutch is divisive. 
Another negative impact of the colonial legal system is the neglect of adat law. As 
mentioned at the outset of this paper, when the Dutch occupied Indonesia, adat law did 
not preoccupy them as they saw it as no law at all. Dutch courts to which the 
Europeans and, to some extent, the Chinese were subject, overruled their adat 
counterparts. The occupation of West Sumatra by the Dutch may serve as an example 
of adat oblivion. In fact, while Article 2 of the West Sumatran colonial Decree known as 
Plakat Panjang41  stipulates that the Dutch colonial government shall not interfere with 
nagari government (village government), as well as the authority of adat leaders 
(penhulu) and their appointment, Article 3 immediately follows up with the sentence: 
the government will appoint some of the leaders as representatives of the colonial 
government who shall be paid and shall act as representatives of the government and 
the people. These two articles not only contradict one another as the former promising 
that the government will not interfere in adat affairs, and the latter which actually does 
the interference. Not only does this prove the subordination of adat law to the colonial 
law but it also shows the Dutch’s disrespect for adat. Rusli Amran,42 discussing the 
relationship between the Dutch colonizers and the Minangkabau people in West 
Sumatra, argues that the intention of the Dutch was to create a parallel government in 
order to compete and ultimately destroy traditional government system that has been 
running for centuries and replacing it with aristocratic government like in Java.  Rusli 
argues that not only did the Dutch destroy adat but they also put in place systems and 
practices he believes were deemed repugnant and ridiculous in the eyes of the 
Minangkabau people. He observes: 
What disgusted the people and became a mockery were the titles handed out by the Dutch 
colonial administration as they were all created to mimic the conditions in other places, in 
Java, for example. But all of these titles or ranks have nothing to do with adat. They have no 
connection with the living law (adat) as they were only forced upon the people. Those titles 
are: regent, head of village, chief penghulu, clan penghulu, etc.43  
Rusli claims that approximately 40 years following the promulgation of Plakat Panjang 
in West Sumatra, there still was a discrepancy between colonizers and the Minangkabau 
                                                          
41  Plakat Panjang is a colonial document containing the then colonial Commissary General Van den 
Bosch’s 7 point commitment to the Minangkabau. Ten days after Van den Bosch left West Sumatra, the 
announcement known to the Minangkabau as Plakat Panjang was made on October 25, 1833. This 
announcement was issued by the two Government Commissioners on behalf of the Commissioner-
General (Van den Bosch). This is an official document containing the solemn promise of the Dutch 
government to the Minangkabau people who had protested prior to Van den Bosch’s visit. Many of such 
documents were released by the Dutch throughout occupied Indonesia. For more on Plakat Panjang see 
Amran, R. (1981), Sumatra Barat. Hingga Plakat Panjang, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta. 
42  Ibid, p.187 
43  Ibid. p. 189 
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people regarding the law: it was written on paper that the judiciary shall be run 
"according to the custom, traditional indigenous ways" but in practice, only Western 
applies.44 He concludes by making the sad remark that the Dutch succeeded in 
influencing or changing the customary court system, thanks to their officials such as 
heads of village and chief penghulu whom they paid. Rusli believes that this is the 
reason why pure adat court system is no longer able to survive.45   
In Western Europe, a small part of the world whose civilization has dominated nearly 
the rest of the world, customary laws were at the epicenter of the legal systems. The 
term Common Law which means law developed as a result of custom and judicial 
decisions suffices to prove this reality. 46 Clarence Darrow,47 agrees that custom is the 
true driving force of the law. During the pre-revolutionary period in America, the 
thirteen colonies developed their own judicial systems despite the enormous influence 
of the England common law legal system each had its own local variations and 
customs to which strong attachment developed.  The importance of customs in shaping 
the legal system is demonstrated by Darrow when he argues that men from the earliest 
time arranged themselves into groups; they traveled in a certain way; they established 
habits and customs and ways of life. These “folk-ways” were born long before human 
laws and were enforced more rigidly than the statutes of a later age. Slowly men 
embodied their “taboos,” their incantations, their habits and customs into religions and 
statutes. He emphasizes that a law was only a codification of a habit or custom that 
long ago was a part of the life of a people, and that the legislator never really makes the 
law; he simply writes in the books what has already become the rule of action by force 
of custom or opinion, or at least what he thinks has become a law.  However, Darrow 
goes on to say that neither conscience nor religion (though it is higher and more 
binding on man than human law) is the foundation of the law.  
In fact, Darrow believes that religion is controversial as it rests on interpretation, and 
even the things that seem the plainest have ever been subject to manifold and 
sometimes conflicting construction. He therefore concludes that religious doctrines do 
not and clearly cannot be adopted as the criminal code of a state.48  As for conscience, 
Darrow argues that it is purely a matter of environment, education, and temperament, 
and is no more infallible than any habit or belief. None of the generally accepted 
theories of the basis of right and wrong has ever been the foundation of law or morals 
Darrow observes.49 He claims that the true driving force of the law is custom—the 
folkway. These customs and folk-ways must be so important in the opinion of the 
community as to make their violation a serious affair. Such violation is considered evil 
regardless of whether the motives are selfish or unselfish, good or bad.50 Darrow 
concludes that laws which interfere with the habits, customs, and beliefs of a large 
number of people never receive the assent of so large a percentage as to make people 
                                                          
44  Ibid. p. 222 
45  Ibid. p. 227 
46  Read Sandra Day O’Connor (2003), The Majesty of the Law, reflection of the Supreme Court Justice. Chap 22 
47  Read Darrow, C, (1922) Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, the Pennsylvania State University Electronic 
Classics Series 2004. p. 9, 78 
48  Ibid. p. 7 
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conscious of any wrong in violating them, and therefore people break them when they 
can.51   
However, it has been 72 years that independence was proclaimed. But surprisingly, the 
so-called new legal system still displays the same landscape as its colonial predecessor. 
Evidence of this could be found in the Article 7 section (1) of Law No. 12 / 2012 which 
sets the following as the hierarchy of laws in Indonesia: 
1. The 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945);  
2. The Provision of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); 
3. Statutes (Undang-undang) / Interim Emergency Laws (PERPU); 
4. Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah);  
5. Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presidenor PP); 
6. Provincial Regulation (Peraturan Daerah or Perda); 
7. District Regulation (Peraturan Kota). 
Much like the 1945 Constitution whereby adat law is not mentioned in plain legal 
language, the above law is ignorant of adat law. Who is to blame for this neglect? The 
Parliament? Or adat leaders? The research revealed that a great part of the 
responsibility is to be attributed to the inefficiency of some some adat leaders who have 
renounced their duty of holding the Parliament accountable for failing to apply adat. 
Most adat leaders seem to lack any interest in the law-making process and would 
rather handle petty crimes while living off government handouts.52 
 
3.2.  Half-century of military and totalitarian regimes  
The first Indonesian organization of armed forces was established on 22 August 1945 
and was called the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR/People’s Security Board) aimed at 
‘maintaining security together with the people and related state bodies’. However, 
when President Sukarno took power, he changed the name of BKR to Tentara Keamanan 
Rakyat (People’s Security Army/TKR) on 5 October 1945 marking the birth of the 
Indonesian military.53 This date is considered the anniversary of the Indonesian Armed 
forces. From this moment on, the Indonesian military has continued to interfere in both 
political and legal affairs.54 The involvement of the army in political arena after 
Indonesia proclaimed independence is due to the fact that the very soldiers who fought 
for independence and later reorganized themselves to form the military base of the 
nation had a prior history of being members of political organizations and the militia 
wings of political parties during the Dutch colonial era. Two events explain the Army’s 
involvement in politics:55  
a. The declaration of martial law in 1957 allowing the military to get involved in 
politics as they ran the state of emergency; and  
                                                          
51  Ibid. p. 79 
52  During an interview at his office on December 18, 2014, Dr. Risnaldi, a DPRD Member told me that 
adat leaders do not make use of the procedure given to them for having a say in legislations in West 
Sumatra. He explained that not making use provided means signifies that adat leaders simply do not 
submit reports of their concerns to the local DPRD.  
53  See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia. Crise working paper No. 
62  January 2009. p. 6 
54  See Herbert Feith, Suharto's Search For a Political Format, Australia's Neighbours, May-June 1968. 
55  Ibid. p. 7 
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b. The introduction of the ‘middle way’ concept in 1958 by the then Army Chief of 
Staff A.H. Nasution.  
The middle way basically provided the opportunity for TNI (the new Indonesian 
Military) to become involved in the government on the basis of the “asas kekeluargaan” 
principle (the Family Principle). These ideas were later developed by the New Order 
under Suharto who took power following the political violence of 1 October 1965 as the 
representative of the military then referred to as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia 
(ABRI)- Indonesian Armed Forces, ABRI). Suharto swore in as president in 1968. 
Elections56 were held in 1971, but they were tightly controlled by the government. The 
government-backed Golkar (Golongan Karya) party secured most of the seats in the 
Parliament, as it would in each of the elections held at five-year intervals thereafter. 
Similarly, the People’s Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR) routinely returned Suharto to the presidency, unopposed, at five-year intervals.  
He then used the military to build personal power and a dictatorship.  To support his 
efforts, Suharto established a pyramid base whereby he controlled all resources of 
power.57  Similarly, the military was not only involved in politics but in the legislative. 
In fact, during Orde Baru the military held a certain number of seats in the House of 
Representatives and the People’s Consultative Assembly.58  
During Suharto’s administration, the demand of military group that one-fifth of the 
members of provincial district assemblies, approximately one-fourth of the members of 
Parliament, and one-third of the members of the People's Congress be appointed by 
President Suharto's military establishment was agreed to in late 1969 with nearly no 
major opposition from the political parties. However, the 360 members of Parliament, 
not appointed by the military were to be elected on the basis of party preference rather 
than individually.59 The following table presents the number of seats held by the 
military during Suharto’s presidency: 
 
Table 1. Number of ABRI seats in DPR from 1967 to 1999 
Year Number of Seats Total Seats 
1967 43 350 
1968 75 414 
1969 75 460 
1985 100 550 
1992 100 550 
1997 75 550 
1999 35 550 
Source: Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Sri Yanuarti and Mochamad Nurhasim, Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in 
Indonesia. Crise Working Paper No. 62, January 2009. 
 
                                                          
56  Under both Sukarno and Suharto’ regimes no direct free and democratic elections were held. Their 
terms were extended only through votes in unrepresentative parliaments. The Parliament during that 
time period was unrepresentative because a vast majority of the seats was held by military officers 
chosen by the president since all the political parties were banned back then (see table 5). 
57  Read Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., Military Politics, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Indonesia. Crise Working Paper 
No. 62  January 2009. p. 6 
58  See Schwarz, A., & Paris, J. (1999), The Politics of Post- Suharto Indonesia. Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, New York. p. 3-15 
59  Emmerson, D.K. (1999), Op.Cit. p. 44-45 
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Bhakti’s analysis is confirmed by Herbert Feith when he argues that on January 30 the 
acting president disclosed the terms of parliament's "redressing." Its membership 
would be raised from 347 to 414. The representation of the armed services would be 
raised from 43 to 75.60  
Vital to the New Order and how it worked were Indonesia’s army forces. They 
maintained the domination of the state over society. They justified their intervention in 
civilian politics under the doctrine known as dwifungsi,61 the dual function. According 
to this idea, the armed forces has two closely related roles; to defend the country not 
only from conventional military threats originating abroad, but also from domestic 
dangers of any kind, military, politics, socioeconomic, cultural, or ideological. The 
armed forces implemented the interventionist dual-function doctrine by placing active 
and retired military personnel in the assembly, parliament, and provincial and district 
legislatures; in executive and staff positions in central, provincial, and district 
administration; in positions of formal and informal authority over Golkar; and by 
keeping the population under surveillance through territorial command that covered 
the country from Jakarta to the outermost islands and down to every village. Serving 
officers occupied roughly one-fifth of the seats in every regional legislature, where they 
reported to their local commanders, and in national parliament and assembly. Serving 
and retired officers were appointed to post in civilian government for reasons of 
patronage and control. Nearly half of the provincial governorship and district 
headship, by far the most important civilian government positions in the regions, were 
also in military hands.62 However, since the advent of Era Reformasi, the Indonesian 
Military has given up its duafungsi and has returned to its primary duty that is to 
defend the integrity of Indonesia and its people against possible attacks both from 
within and outside.63  The unprecedented example of the non-involvement in politics is 
the role it played during the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid 
in July 2001. The military refused to back him up when he attempted to hold onto 
power by issuing an emergency decree to dissolve the Parliament that filed two 
separate censures of MPR against Wahid alleging corruption and incompetence. 
 
3.3.  Corruption within state apparatus  
Corruption has long been one of the most critical problems that undermine the 
Indonesian administration. The symptoms of this social disease were felt as early as 
during President Sukarno’s regime. In no way this means that corruption did not exist 
under the Dutch colonial administration. The period ensuing independence is relevant 
as it marks the birth of a new State capable of running its own affairs. After 
independence was gained, two political regimes, i.e. the Sukarno and the Suharto 
regimes considered by most Indonesian as well as foreign scholars as the most 
totalitarian and the most corrupt regimes Indonesia has ever had, contributed into 
plundering the vast majority of the wealth the country has. Although some of 
Suharto’s policies are deemed to have brought about considerable economic growth, 
many of his actions worked towards the very opposite direction of the alleged 
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achievement. A large share of Indonesia’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of the 
president’s family and their associates.64 Writing at the dawn of Indonesia’s 
independence, Feith, denounces the corruption under both Sukarno and Suharto’s 
administrations when he argues: 
“…Suharto must hesitate before he introduces measures which will add to the pressure 
which the government exerts on the great mass of the population, for he knows that most 
such measures are likely to be implemented in distorted fashion at the local level and to be 
used as warrants for more regulatory activity hampering the flow of trade. Government has 
borne down quite heavily on this great mass of lower-class people, and it has done so in fairly 
arbitrary fashion—witness the many illegal tolls, the often very high cost of bribes for 
formally free government services, and the not infrequent demands by local officials for 
unpaid labor. This was the situation in the Soekarno period; it is much the same now, and is 
aggravated inasmuch as increased numbers of villagers and lower-class townsmen now live 
under political arrest or in its shadow.”65  
Corruption under Suharto’s administration is also known and criticized by many 
Indonesian scholars including Bhakti who argues that Suharto’s regime created a lot of 
problems to Indonesians, including human suffering, corruption, collusion, nepotism, 
economic dependency on foreign debt, and economic collapse. Apart from that, during 
the Suharto period, there was no political freedom at all.66  Since its advent, Era 
reformasi (the political era that came into being after the collapse of Suharto and his 
Orde Baru) vowed to rid the sociopolitical and legal fields of corruption by embarking 
on massive reforms; hence its name. Today however, though these reforms sound 
beautiful, they seem unable to eradicate corruption.67 Not only has corruption taken 
roots within the central government, but it has also spread throughout nearly every 
Indonesian province.  President Bambang Yudoyono, having realized the escalation of 
corruption decided to go to war with it by empowering the Corruption Courts along 
with Commission for Corruption Eradication or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK).  
Corruption Court was established by Law No. 30/2002 on Corruption Eradication 
Commission. Under this Act, there was only one corruption Court located at Central 
Jakarta District Court. However, with the enactment of Law No. 46/2009 on 
Corruption Court, more corruption Courts may be found in every capital city/district 
whose jurisdiction covers an area of law of the concerned Court.68 KPK is a state 
agency which, in the course of performing its duties and authority, is independent and 
free from any influences.69  Since modern corruption in Indonesia is catalogued as an 
extraordinary crime, the creation of KPK is based on the need for its systematic 
eradication.70  According to Law No. 30 of 2002, KPK is vested with the authority to:  
a) Coordinate with other institutions authorized to eradicate corruption;  
b) Perform pre-investigations, investigations, and prosecutions against corrupt acts; 
c) Perform preventive actions against corruptions; acts and; 
d) Monitor state governance. 
                                                          
64  Ibid.. p. 5-15 
65  See Herbert Feith, Suharto's Search For a Political Format, Australia's Neighbours, May-June 1968. 
66  See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems. 
67  See KPK’s Annual Reports from 2004 to 2014. 
68  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2010. 
69  See the Openings of KPK’s Annual Reports. 
70  See the Openings of KPK’s Annual Reports. 
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KPK investigates acts of corruption committed by Government officials (The trial of 
former Minister for Religious Affairs (2005) along with his former Secretary General 
and the arresting of former Chief of BKPM (Investment Coordinating Board), 
Governor, Regent, Mayor, Members of Parliament, Board of Directors of State-Owned 
Enterprises, National Police, and Civil Servants. It basically holds everyone having 
public authority accountable for their actions before the Indonesian people. Today, 
KPK regards itself as a “catalyst of corruption eradication and governance reform”.71 
The battle to eradicate corruption in Indonesia is not a recent initiative. In fact, several 
institutions aiming at the eradication of corruption had existed before the creation of 
KPK. Those institutions are: the Military Operation (1957), the Corruption Eradication 
Team (1967), the Commission for the Appraisal of the Wealth of Government 
Executives (KPKPN), and the Joint Commission for Corruption Eradication (2000).  But 
according to KPK’s Commissioners, those previous institutions were not focused on 
prevention efforts.72  There is no better institution to look for data on corruption than 
KPK. The following diagrams show the number of corruption cases prosecuted by KPK 
from 2004 up to 2014. 
Table 2. Corruption cases prosecuted by KPK from 2004 to 2012 
No Occupation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 Parliament Member    02 07 08 27 05 16 
2 Head of State Institutions  01 01  01 01 02  01 
3 Ambassador    02 01  01   
4 Commissioner  03 02 01 01     
5 Governor 01  02  02 02 01   
6 Mayor/Regent   03 07 05 05 04 04 04 
7 Echelon I, II & III 02 09 15 10 22 14 12 15 08 
8 Judge       01 02 02 
9 Private 01 04 05 03 12 11 08 10 16 
10 Others  06 01 02 04 04 09 03 03 
Total 04 23 29 27 55 45 65 39 50 
Source: KPK’s Annual Report. 
 
In addition to KPK’s data, 815 corruption cases were prosecuted by the Supreme Court 
or Mahkamah Agung (MA) in the year 2007.73 Within the following year, 2008, the 
Supreme Court handled 1.545 cases of corruption.74 In 2009 however, only 64 cases 
were brought before the Supreme Court.75 In the year 2010, only 44 cases raised.76  2011 
seemed to be a very busy year for the Supreme Court for it dealt with 963 corruption 
cases plus 06 other cases perpetrated by the Army.77 No clear data on the number of 
corruption cases handled in the year 2012 is provided by the Supreme Court,78 which, 
from 2007 up to 2012, has prosecuted over 3437 cases of corruption. While from 2004 to 
2012 KPK has handled a total number of 337 corruption cases from the Indonesian 
                                                          
71  See KPK’s Annual Report 2005 
72  Ibid. 
73  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2007, p. 23-24 
74  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2008, p. 19 
75  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2009, p. 37 
76  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2010, p. 60. 
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most trusted Individuals and Institutions. Of all these corruption cases, the three 
government branches account for 128.  
 
Table 3.  Corruption cases prosecuted by KPK in 2013 
No Occupation 2013 
1 Parliament Member 08 
2 Head of State Institutions 04 
3 Ambassador - 
4 Commissioner - 
5 Governor 02 
6 Mayor/Regent 03 
7 Echelon I, II & III 07 
8 Judge 04 
9 Private 24 
10 Others 07 
Total 59 
Source: KPK’s Annual Report. 
 
Table 4.  Corruption cases prosecuted by KPK in 2014 
No Occupation 2014 
1 Parliament Member 04 
2 Head of State Institutions 09 
3 Ambassador - 
4 Commissioner - 
5 Governor 02 
6 Mayor/Regent 12 
7 Echelon I, II & III 02 
8 Judge 02 
9 Private 15 
10 Others 08 
Total 54 
Source: KPK’s Annual Report. 
 
In the same year 2014, 689 corruption cases were handled by the Indonesian Supreme 
Court.79 From 2004 to 2014, KPK has investigated and repressed 450 corruption cases 
not to mention those dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence. Of these 450 cases, 77 
were perpetrated by parliament members. All these figures prove that corruption runs 
at the highest level of the government which most certainly destroys the trust of the 
public in government officials. Everything is lost when the public loses faith and trust 
in the people who represent them. Legal system and institutions that support it would 
lose all credit in the eyes of the people as they no longer rely on them. No wonder why 
60% do not trust the police (see Table 6). At this point people would start to rely more 
and more on customary law and customary courts. Corruption is a serious threat to the 
development of legal system and the reliability of legal institutions. The Indonesian 
people hate corruption as much as they welcome any effort to fight it. This can be 
proved through the following survey conducted on KPK during the research. 
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Table 5. Evaluation of KPK’s work 
Age 
Type of Answer, Gender & number of Respondent 
Yes Maybe No Idea 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
18-28 77 50 19 26 5 7 
29-39 22 19 3 8 2 1 
40-50 15 8 1 9  2 
51-61 15 3 1  2  
62-72 5      
Total 134 80 24 43 9 10 
% M/F 81 60 15 32 5 7 
Combined % 71.3 22.3 6.3 








Chart 1. Evaluation of KPK's work
                                                                    Source: Same as the above 
It can be inferred from the above data that the work of KPK is appreciated by a vast 
majority of the Indonesian people. Consequently, this shows that KPK has the support 
of the majority of Indonesians in its struggle to build a corruption-free Indonesia.  
Besides the legislative, corruption also prevails within the judiciary. It spreads from the 
locale Police to the Lower Courts before making its way to State’s Higher Courts (the 
arrest of the Constitutional Chief Justice by KPK in 2013 is sadly one example). Under 
the 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian Police force or Polisi Republik Indonesia (POLRI) 
is vested with power to enforce the law. In fact, Article 30 section 4 of the Indonesian 
Constitution stipulates that POLRI, as an instrument of the state that maintains public 
order and security, has the duty to protect, guard, and serve the people, and to uphold 
the law. This makes the police the very first guardian of the law. Unfortunately, 
however, the police seem to have lost credibility in the eyes of the population. During 
research, respondents were asked whether or not they trust their local police. The 
following table and chart provide answers to this question: 
Table 6. The people’s trust in the police 
Age 
Type of answer, gender & number of respondent 
Yes Maybe No More or Less 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
18-28 32 24 2 3 63 54 4 2 
29-39 12 4 1  13 23 1 1 
40-50 7 3  4 8 12 1 1 
51-61 11 1   6 2   
62-72 5        
Total 67 32 3 7 90 91 6 4 
% M/F 40 24 2 5 54 68 4 3 
Combined % 33 3.3 60 3.3 













Source: data collected from 5 different research fields (Aceh, Bali, Batam, Medan and West Sumatera). 
 
The research reveals that 60% do not have trust in the police. When asked the reason 
why, most of the respondents pointed at corruption. The police are not the only ones to 
blame, the system of recruitment, too, has a great part of responsibility. In fact, 
although there is no official data, it is repeatedly heard that a significant sum of money 
needs to be paid to whoever has power within the police hierarchy if one wants to join 
the forces. Should this be true, a police officer might want to get back all the money he 
paid by unjustly and illegally taxing the population. There is a lack of data because the 
subject matter is corruption, which is always underground, thus elusive. It can also be 
inferred from the above data that a vast majority of the Indonesian population thinks 
that the police does not or cannot provide justice. This really is detrimental to the rule 
of law whose purpose is to strengthen institutions of the state by increasing the 
people’s trust in them. The people’s mistrust in the police contributes into weakening 
the justice system. Another major factor that contributes into weakening the 
Indonesian justice system is the corruption of the judges.  
The corruption within the judiciary has been exposed to the public by KPK ever since 
its creation in 2000. As showed above, from 2004 to 2014, KPK has investigated and 
repressed 450 corruption cases excluding those dropped due to lack of sufficient 
evidence. Of these 450 cases, 77 were perpetrated by parliament members and 11 were 
committed by High Court judges. The arrest of the Constitutional Chief Justice in 2013 
is the most critical of all the corruption cases prosecuted by KPK. In fact, on the night 
of 02 October, 2013, Constitutional Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar, one of the highest 
officials of the country and therefore head of one of the highest institutions of law 
enforcement in Indonesia (the Constitutional Court or Makahmah Konstitusi (MK)) was 
arrested by KPK. He was suspected of accepting bribes related to the election dispute 
case of two heads of the region, namely in Gunung Mas, Central Kalimantan and Lebak, 
Banten. The alleged corruption involved evidence of money around Rp. 3 billion in 
foreign currency and Rupiah. KPK steeped in this corruption case after receiving a 
report from the public since the beginning of September that year. Such a scandal not 
only ruins the reputation of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, but more 
importantly, it does help reinforce the skepticism of the Indonesian people toward 
their institutions.  
The 1945 Constitution recognizes five courts: Public Courts, Religious Affairs courts, 
Military Tribunals, State Administrative Courts, and Constitutional Court. When 
asking the Indonesian people what in their opinion all these courts suffer most, they 
mostly point at corruption. It is very common to hear people say that the Indonesian 
justice system only works for the affluent people, that ‘all you need to win is money’, says 
a respondent during the research. As mentioned above, in the year 2007 alone, the 
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Supreme Court handled 815 cases of corruption, 18.467 cases of narcotic, and 2.213 
cases of illegal logging. The prosecution of these three criminal cases by the Supreme 
Court has helped the state recover Rp. 142.692.724.942 as either fine or reparation.80  In 
2008, the Supreme Court handled 1.545 corruption cases, 22.649 cases of narcotic, and 
2.446 cases of illegal logging. Consequently, Rp. 382.300.098.604 was returned to the 
state.81 
 
3.4.  Unsynchronized Laws  
As enumerated previously, the Indonesian Legislative order is set forth in Article 7 
paragraph (1) of Law No. 12 of 2012 as follow: 
1- The 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945); 2- The Provision of People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR); 3- Statutes (Undang-undang)/Interim Emergency Laws 
(PERPU); 4- Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah); 4- Presidential Regulation 
(Peraturan Presiden); 5- Provincial Regulation; 6- District Regulation. 
For the legal system to make sense there should be a vertical synchronization between 
the above laws/regulations (though no room is made for customary law as discussed 
earlier). This means that each type of law must not conflict with any law higher than its 
own type in the hierarchy; and a law can amend or repeal a law lower than its own 
type in the hierarchy. Simply speaking, a Provincial Regulation or Peraturan Daerah 
(Perda) is legally valid, only if/when it does not contradict a law higher on the 
hierarchy; and, once passed, a Perda may be canceled by any statute higher on the 
hierarchy. A case of such conditions between higher and lower laws is pointed out by 
Tjondronegoro (2003) when he argues that although the Regional Autonomy Act no.22/ 
1999 confers greater competency of land use to the Regent (Bupati), there is a 
subsequent Presidential Decree No.10/ 2001 (made in April 2001) that seems to 
overrule this provision. This decree mandates that local government cannot enact law 
regulations on land. Legally speaking, Presidential Decrees are considered to be 
subordinate to Laws enacted by parliament, such as the Agrarian Reform and Natural 
Resource Management Act. Yet district administrators are expected to obey the 
decrees. This causes confusion as to which law should apply.82   
There are several cases of contradicting laws within the Indonesian Legislation, which 
unfortunately, help prove that conformity in laws is yet to be achieved.83 The 
inconsistency within the Indonesian legal system is not recent; in fact, it dates as far 
back as during colonialism. The best example to illustrate this assumption is the West 
Sumatran colonial Decree known as Plakat Panjang issued on October 25, 1833 by the 
then Commissioner General Van den Bosch.84 The document contains mostly the 7 
commitments Bosch made to the Minangkabau people after severe riots broke up.85  
Article 2 of this document stipulates that the Dutch colonial government shall not 
interfere with nagari government (village government), as well as the authority of adat 
                                                          
80  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2007, p. 23 
81  See Supreme Court’s Annual Report 2008, p. 19 
82  See Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro, Land Policies in Indonesia. World Bank Working Paper No. 37435, June 
19, 2003 
83  Ibid. 
84  Van den Bosch was the commissioner General in Charge of Dutch colonial administrations in several 
Indonesian provinces, including West Sumatra. 
85  See Amran, Rusli (1981), Sumatra Barat. Hingga Plakat Panjang, p.10 
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leaders (penghulu) and their appointments. Article 3 immediately follows up with the 
sentence: the government will appoint some of the leaders as representatives of the 
colonial government who shall be paid and shall act as representatives of the 
government and the people. Needless to say that these two articles are contradictory as 
one promises one thing and the other disregards the very same thing.86  
The followings are other cases of contradicting laws between central and local 
governments: 
Case 1: 
Provincial Government Regulation No. 9/2000, nagari government is vested with authority 
over tanah ulayat for the benefit of all community members, yet there is a Presidential Decree 
(Decree No. 10/ 2001) promulgated in 2001 that says land administration throughout 
Indonesia should be centralized. This Provincial Regulation not only contradicts the 
Presidential Decree, but it is also in contradiction with Article 33 section 3 of the Constitution 
which stipulates that land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the 
powers of the state and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.87 
Case 2:  
Madiun District Perda No 4 of 2001 on the Establishment of the Village Representative Body. 
This Perda aims to provide greater representation to women and youth.  However, this Local 
Regulation was met with discontent from the village leaders on the ground that it contradicts 
Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MOHA) Decision No 64 of 1999, which does not provide for this 
greater representation.88   
Case 3:  
Tangerang City Perda No 8/2005 on Prostitution. This Regional Regulation forbids anyone 
whose attitude or behavior is ‘suspicious, making him or her appear to be a prostitute’ from 
being on a road, hotel, or ‘other places’ in the city (art 4(1)). It also prohibits persons from 
working as prostitutes or running brothels (art 2(1) and (2)). This Perda violates some of the 
fundamental rights enshrined Indonesian Constitution such as equality before the law, and non-
discrimination. By targeting certain individuals, the Perda breaks with one of the core 
principles of the law i.e. the generality of the law. This also contradicts the Indonesian Criminal 
Code (KUHP) as it does not guarantee the presumption of innocence. Finally, this Perda 
contradicts many sections of the Article 28 of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution. It also 
contradicts Law No. 39/ 1999 on Human Rights. There are numerous other cases but I have 
enumerated here just a few. In no way, I argue that Indonesian legislative bodies are at war 
with each other as many of their laws contradict one another. Instead, I suggest that there 
should be more synergy with regard to the law-making process for a more comprehensible and 
efficient legal system. 
Case 4:  
The discrepancy between the Aceh Islamic Law and the Indonesian national law as pointed out 
by Arskal Salim. He argues that many proponents of the sharia in Aceh were already 
predisposed toward viewing the central government’s offer to re-establish an independent 
Mahkamah Syar’iyah in Aceh with considerable skepticism. This was mainly due to the 
                                                          
86  Ibid. 
87  See Tegnan, H. (2015). “Legal Pluralism and Land Administration in West Sumatra: The 
Implementation of Local and Nagari Governments’ Regulations on Communal Land Tenure.” The 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law. p. 5-9 
88  See Supreme Court Decision No 03 G/HUM/2002. 
P-ISSN: 2442-9880, E-ISSN: 2442-9899 
 138   
 
ambiguous jurisdiction granted to the Mahkamah Syar’iyah. Article 25 (2) of Law 18/2001 
mentioned that the Mahkamah Syar’iyah’s jurisdiction was subordinated to the prevalent 
national legal system. The text of Article 25 (2) stated:“The jurisdiction of the Mahkamah 
Syar’iyah (…) is based on the Islamic shari’a within the national legal system, which will be 
further arranged through the Qanun of the Province of  Aceh .  Salim claims that two phrases 
contradict each other within the above statute. 
A number of studies suggest that Indonesia has known two legal systems i.e., the pre-
independence and the after independence legal systems, and that legal pluralism in 
Indonesia is the consequence of colonialism. It is important to note that during the last 
two decades, Indonesian legal system underwent a series of crucial reforms to the 
extent that it is no longer scholarly to assume that these two periods helped shape the 
Indonesian legal system. A third period known as Era Reformasi as discussed earlier, 
constitutes a major turning point within the Indonesian legal system in that it broke up 
radically with colonial legal tradition put in place before and after independence was 
obtained. It is also false to believe that legal pluralism is the product of colonialism in 
that the Indonesian people have been practicing legal pluralism long before 
colonialism. Though vital, the reforms brought up by Era Reformasi did not suppress 
adat and Islamic laws that make up the Indonesian legal system besides the National 
Law. Instead, it contributed to promoting them through decentralization process. The 
revival of nagari government after the fall of President Suharto, is an example. 
However, the changes brought about by Era Reformasi did not truly provide room for 
adat law within the Indonesian legal system as discussed above. Acknowledging this is 
Safitri who argues that the state law has adopted both adat and Islamic law. Yet, in 
many fields, people continue to struggle to get their adat laws respected and 
recognized by the state.89  
 
4.  Conclusion 
The Indonesian culture has been shaped by long interaction between original 
indigenous customs and multiple foreign religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity which has resulted in the birth of a complex 
national legal system.90 The complexity of the Indonesian legal system led its ‘founding 
fathers’ to wisely opt for the rule of law, not the rule of Islam or customs as the driving 
force of the law in Indonesia. As many postcolonial civil law countries, the Indonesian 
legal system was first customary and Islamic before the arrival of the Dutch with their 
Western Civil Law. It is important to know that not only did Indonesia inherited a 
distorted version of the Dutch legal system as the same colonial law did not apply back 
in Holland, but she also received an inaccurate account of her own customary laws as 
they were translated and recorded based on the colonizers’ interests. It therefore makes 
little sense to claim that the Indonesian legal system takes its roots in the Indonesian 
customary law.  
Surprisingly, however, when independence was gained, the ‘founding fathers’ chose to 
uphold the very same discriminatory, divisive, and misleading colonial legal system, 
instead of building one that truly reflects their own people’s way of life. Both President 
                                                          
89  See Safitri, M.A. (2011), Legal pluralism in Indonesia’s land and natural resource tenure, Forest Peoples 
Programme (FPP) and Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP). 
90  Daniel S. Lev (1972), Op.Cit. 
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Sukarno and his successor President Suharto failed to reverse this tendency as their 
respective regimes were deemed authoritarian. Neither Orde Lama nor Orde Baru did 
succeed in establishing an environment whereby the rule of law, democracy, and 
human rights would thrive. Shortly after the collapse of Orde Baru, Era Reformasi was 
brought in and promised hope and happiness to the Indonesian people through 
reforms. It is under this political concept that the Indonesian legal system began to 
break away not only from its colonial legacy but also from the path it had been taking 
four decades after independence. Some of the changes brought about by Era Reformasi 
include freedom, regional autonomy, the establishment of a corruption eradication 
commission, government accountability, free democratic elections, and the 
constitutionalizing of human rights principles. Despite the ongoing efforts to improve 
the Indonesian legal system, several issues need to be addressed such as the hegemony 
of Western legal tradition, the neglect of adat and Islamic laws, corruption and 
nepotism, and unsynchronized and confusing laws/regulations. Although there are no 
perfect legal systems, the need to minimize confusion and uncertainty within the law is 
more than crucial. Laws that contradict one another or confuse the mind of individuals 
are no laws at all for law is order and harmony. 
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